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NOTES AND COMMENT

In Land, Log, and Lumber Co. vs. McIntyre, IoO Wis. 245; 75 N.W.
964, 69 Am. St. Rep. 915, this above distinction is brought out. There,
a member of the county board received money from the county on
such an illegal contract and the county not being in pari delicto was
allowed to recover the money so paid in a taxpayer's action. In Lauro
vs. Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company 131 Wis. 555; III N.W.
66o, Justice Timlin presents many cases illustrating the general principle applicable in such cases. He there quotes with approval from Harris
vs. Runnels, 12 How. 72, "It must be obvious from such diversities
of legislation, that Statutes forbidding or enjoining things to be done,
with penalties accordingly, should always be fully examined before
courts should refuse to give aid to enforce contracts which are said
to be in contravention of them."
The late Chief Justice Vinje said -that the principle running through
the cases is this: "Not all contracts forbidden by statute are void."
The entire subject is admirably discussed, and numerous cases cited
which are to the point in a note at Page 618, 12 L.R.A. (NS). The
principle to be applied, which would give relief to the blameless party,
and the innocent victim, seems to be: Where the contract is not expressly prohibited by statute, where the contract is not Mallm per se,
or where the parties are not in pari delicto, courts will look to the
purpose and intent of the statute and give it effect accordingly.
STANLEY D. CELICHOWSKI
Lateral Support; Rights and Duties of, to Adjoining Landowners
The subject of lateral support touching on the rights and duties of
property owners to the same is of utmost importance to the practicing
lawyer of today. We are living in an age of concentration of forces
which has resulted in the upbuilding of large cities. The growth of
cities has greatly increased the value of property in certain districts.
Likewise the growth of cities has made for the concentration of forces
in particular districts for commercial purposes. The increase in value
together with the desirability of concentration has led to the utilization of every foot of land by property owners. The above two forces
have likewise resulted in the placing of greater burdens on the land
through the building of higher buildings. Years ago when a man
built on his property he erected his building within his lot so that the
support from his own land was enough to protect his structure in case
his neighbor wished to excavate and build on his land. The immense
structures which are built today, usually extend to the edge of the
lot line. When the adjoining owner wishes to construct a building
on his lot, there is danger of the first building being damaged if some
means of support is not given during the time the excavation is being
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made when the natural support which the adjoining lot gives is taken
away. For the above reasons, the question of the rights and duties
of adjoining landowners with regard to lateral support has become art
important phase in the law of real property. Due to its growing importance, a brief review of the law on the subject is here given so that
the reader -may have a basis of research should he wish to delve deeper
into the subject.
The underlying principle governing the rights and the duties of adjoining property owners to lateral support is of itself simple. Granting his land is in its natural condition (no added burden thereon), a
property owner has the absolute right to the lateral support of his
neighbor's soil. Conversely, a property owner has the duty of furnishing the lateral support which his land gives when left in its natural
condition. Eschweiler, J. in Hickman v. Wallauer,1 ably states the law
in these words: "As incident to the plaintiff's ownership of his lot,
he had the absolute right, so far as the land was in its natural condition, to lateral support from the defendant's lot." As an illustration of
this basic principle let us suppose two adjoining lot owners, A. and B.
A. has a right to excavate on his lot to any depth providing he furnishes
B. with the same lateral support which his land furnished before he
started his improvements. For this duty which A., the party changing
the nature of his land, owes to B., the adjoining property owner, there
is of course the corresponding right of B. to have the lateral support
which A.'s land gave when in its natural condition. Added authority
for this basic principle may be found in Christensen v. Mann,2 Wahl
v. Kelley, 3 Schaefer v. Hoffman.4 See also Cooley on Torts, 1236 to
1238.

Most of the litigation on this subject, however, rises where the land
has been improved by the construction of buildings and those buildings
are injured as a result of the loss of lateral support when the adjoining
landowner excavates on his propert3r preparatory to construction thereon. We have advanced the principle in the beginning of this article
that the property owner has the right to the lateral support of his neighbor's land, which right is limited to the support necessary to the land
in its natural condition. Where a person adds weight to the soil by
the creation of a building, the person thus creating the burden has the
duty of providing support for the same. "The principle established
by the authorities is, that one landowner cannot, by altering the natural
condition of his land, deprive the adjoining proprietor of the privilege
1 169 Wis. 23.
2187 Wis. 567.
'94
Wis. 564.
4 223 N.W. 847.
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of using his own land as he might have done before; and consequently,
that he cannot, by building a house near the margin of his land, prevent
his neighbor from excavating his own soil, although it may endanger
-the house." 5 Thus if A. erects a building on his lot and B. an adjoining property owner wishes to build on his lot, A. has the duty of protecting the building which he has erected. Of course B. must use ordinary care in his work of excavation. Likewise B. must give A. notice
of his intention to excavate on his land, so that A. may protect his
building. The law is -that if B. fails to give A. due notice of his intention to excavate, it becomes B.'s duty to protect the building on A.'s
lot.
There are a few recent Wisconsin cases which treat the subject of
lateral support at quite a length and which are illustrative of the circumstances which gave rise to litigation on this subject. Hickman
v. Wellauer,8 is one of the leading cases on the subject. In this case,
the defendant through a misunderstanding of a city ordinance, thought
that he was bound to support the building which was on the plaintiff's land. The plaintiff was not notified of the defendant's intention
to build. The means of support adopted by the defendant proved inadequate and as a result the plaintiff's building was damaged. The
court held that the plaintiff was not obliged -to support his building
unless the defendant give him timely notice of his intention to excavate. No notice 'having been given, the duty of supporting the plaintiff's building shifted from the plaintiff to the defendant so that the
defendant is liable for the damage done to the plaintiff's building.
Another leading case on the subject is Christensen v. Mann.7 This
case concerned the construction of the Arcade building in Racine.
Because of -the peculiar circumstances of the case, the owner of the
building did not have the duty of supporting the wall of his building.
Here both owners claimed title to their land through a common grantor. The wall in question had been used as a party wall but the party
constructing the Arcade elected to abandon the party wall which was
entirely on the property of the other owner. But the deed from the
original grantor provided that the party wall should be abandoned only
by the consent of all the parties thereto. Consent to the abandonment
not having been obtained from the owner of the building, the court
held that the party wall had not been abandoned. While the party
wall still existed, the owner of the buiding had the right of the
lateral support which his neighbors' land gave to it. Right to lateral
support of the land with a house on it is vested where the owner
bi R.C.L., 381.
i69 Wis. i8.
187 Wis. 567.
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sells the house to one party and the land contiguous to the house to
another party. Durante v. Alba." The Alba case is cited with approval
in the Mann case, wherein it is pointed out that this right to lateral support of the land and house would run with the land only so long as the
original house stood there.
In Wahl v. Kelley,9 the plaintiff contended that as a result of the
defendant excavating on his property, large fissures had developed on
the plaintiff's property. As a result of this, the plaintiff's cellar had
been damaged by water seeping through. The court held that the plaintiff's complaint stated facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action.
The most recent adjudication of the Wisconsin Court on this subject
is Schaefer v. Hoffman.'0 In this last case, the adjoining landowner
gave the owner of the building notice of his intention to excavate.
The owner of the building had hired a contractor to brace up his garage by artificial support during the time of the excavation. The contractor was out on a fishing party at the time when his services were
needed and as a result the gatage settled and was damaged. The court
held that the owner of the lot on which the excavation was made could
not be held liable for the damage done.
It is interesting to note here some of the circumstances out of which
an adjoining property owner is bound to support the improved land of
another. The Mann case and the Alba case cited above are good illustrations of the duty of lateral support resulting from a covenant that
runs with the land. Somewhat similar is the case of Freeholders of
Hudson v. Woodcliff Land Co.,"' wherein land was granted for the
express purpose of building a road thereon. The court held that the
adjoining owner owed the duty of lateral support to a road built in
accordance with the terms of the deed. Manning v. New Jersey Short
Line R. Co., 12 is authority for the theory that where a railroad takes
land, the adjoining property owners had the duty to support the built
up right of way. It is doubtful whether the courts would follow the
Manning case in the present day because there has been a decided
change in public opinion with regard to the favoritism which was once
shown to railroads.
In the Mann case, Doerfler, J. observes: "The law as laid down in
the Wellauer Case and in other Wisconsin cases is so firmly established in the jurisprudence of this state that it must be deemed a rule
of property, and if any relief or change is sought it must be obtained
*266 Pa. St. 444.
*i94 Wis. 559.

N.W. 847.
65 AtI. 844.

"223

1278 At. 2oo.
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from the legislature. This leads one to speculate on the possibilities
of there being a change in the law of lateral support through legislation. 'In the Wellauer case, the plaintiff based the defendant's liability on a city ordinance which provided: "Any person, firm, or
corporation making excavations or causing the same to be made, shall
properly guard them and shall protect them that the adjoining soil shall
not cave in, and no one shall excavate so as to injure any adjoining
ground or building.'3 The court held that this ordinance could not be
interpreted as placing the duty of supporting the building on the party
doing the work. On page 24 Eschweiler, J. points out that "such well
established property rights as are here involved cannot be taken away
or substantially changed except by express declaration of the legislature, either by statute or by expressly delegating such power to the
common council. Neither of such is found in this case." The ordinance has apparently never been changed. Since this decision was
handed down the Home Rule Amendment was added to our constitution. We wonder what would be the effect of a charter ordinance
similar to the ordinance quoted above, bearing in mind the fact that
the law on lateral support as it exists in Wisconsin today is entirely
bench made law.
JoHN

J. McRAE

Pleading; Demurrer for Nonjoinable Causes of Action Intermingled in One Count
Ernst vs. Schmidt 223 N.W. 559 (Wis.)
Plaintiff loaned money to the Elmwood Co., a corporation engaged
in the development of Texas oil lands. The defendants, stockholders
in said corporation, agreed in writing that in the event that the plaintiff was compelled to foreclose on the corporate property to secure
the loan, they would pay their pro rata share of the loan and take their
pro rata share of the fee. The debt was not paid, plaintiff foreclosed
on said property, and now sues the stockholders to obtain the amount
of the loan according to the agreement.
The plaintiff joined the defendants in one action, failing to separately
state and number the separate causes of action. The defendants demurred separately on the ground that several causes of action had been
improperly united. The lower court overruled this demurrer. On
appeal it was held that such demurrer should have been sustained. The
court said -that where the causes of action are joined in one complaint,
and instead of being individually stated in separate counts they are
joined in one count, the defective pleading is properly reached under
'Milwaukee

Code of

1914, IV, 43.

